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Death Star Drones: 
How Missile Defense Drone Technology Marks 
the Advent of Contingent Sovereignty 
Ben Forsgren* 
Are advances in national security worth pursuing at the 
expense of sovereign equality? A new U.S. drone program may 
soon force the world to decide. Thanks to recent technological 
advances in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and directed-energy 
weapons, the United States will soon have a fleet of missile-defense 
UAVs outfitted with advanced laser weapons designed to destroy 
intercontinental ballistic missiles before the missiles complete 
their launch phase. While these drones would significantly 
decrease the threat of a nuclear attack against the United States, 
they can only function if they are preemptively stationed in the 
sovereign airspace of other countries—a clear violation of current 
international sovereignty law. This article explains the technology 
of the new program, demonstrates how it violates international 
sovereignty law, and argues that its implementation will move the 
world closer to an international system of contingent sovereignty 
that rejects the idea of sovereign equality and subjects weaker 
states to the objectives of strong states. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1977, the world watched for the first time as the sinister 
Death Star shot a crackling green laser into the heart of Alderaan, 
obliterating the planet forever.1 This terrifying, awesome display of 
power forever changed pop culture and, perhaps, inadvertently 
planted the first seeds of the modern directed-energy missile 
defense program. 
Although admittedly less cinematic, the basic concept of the 
Death Star’s hovering laser attack on Alderaan has long been 
considered the “holy grail” of missile defense systems.2 Since 
President Ronald Reagan’s appropriately named “Star Wars” 
missile defense program, the United States has sought to create a 
defense system in which a hovering vehicle instantly identifies, 
targets, and destroys incoming missiles.3 Now, thanks to 
developments in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV or drone) 
technology and directed-energy technology, the dreams of Star 
Wars are becoming a reality in the nascent UAV directed-energy 
 
 1. STAR WARS: EPISODE IV–A NEW HOPE (20th Century Fox 1977). 
 2. Alexander Begej, Beam Us Up Donnie: The Future of Boost Phase Missile Defense, GEO. 
SEC. STUD. REV. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/ 
2019/08/19/beam-us-up-donnie-the-future-of-boost-phase-missile-defense/. 
 3. Tim Weiner, Lies and Rigged ‘Star Wars’ Test Fooled the Kremlin, and Congress,  
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 1993), https://nyti.ms/298SAcl. 
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missile defense program (hereinafter UAV DMDP).4 However, like 
many of science fiction’s ideas, this program does not function 
quite the same in the real world. 
The problem with UAV DMDP is that it requires military 
drones to be preemptively stationed above enemy launch sites in 
order to defend the United States against potential missile 
launches.5 Preemptive self-defense of this nature is prohibited by 
the UN Charter, which only allows states to use self-defense to 
repel “armed attacks.”6 If states could defend against threats that 
were merely perceived, then “defending” states could disregard 
the sovereignty of other states and use military force whenever they 
felt unsettled rather than when they were attacked.7 A regime such 
as this functionally violates the UN Charter’s provisions on 
sovereign equality and self-defense by allowing strong states to 
disregard the sovereign rights of weaker states if they feel 
threatened or uncomfortable―a theoretical paradigm known as 
contingent sovereignty.8 
Because UAV DMDP undeniably has a preemptive self-defense 
element, the United States most likely intends to use it,9 and 
international law is greatly influenced by the practices of powerful 
actors like the United States,10 the adoption of UAV  
DMDP potentially marks the beginning of a new era of 
contingent sovereignty. 
This Note makes the following argument: UAV DMDP 
constitutes preemptive self-defense; preemptive self-defense is an 
indication of contingent sovereignty; thus, UAV DMDP is an 
 
 4. UAV DMDP is my terminology, and it refers to the overall concept rather than a 
single military initiative. Because the program is still developing and entails several projects, 
it does not yet have one all-inclusive name. Sometimes the concept is referred to as a drone 
Low-power Laser Demonstrator project (LPLD), but since that type of laser is not necessarily 
the one that will be used, the name continues to be in flux. 
 5. See Allison Barrie, New Laser-Equipped Drones Will Take out Missile Threats Against 
the US, FOX NEWS (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/tech/new-laser-equipped-
drones-will-take-out-missile-threats-against-the-us. 
 6. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 7. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; U.N. Charter art. 51 (requiring all states to “refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state,” unless an “armed attack occurs”). 
 8. See Ian Hurd, Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent 
World, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 293, 305 (2011); infra Section I.C. 
 9. See infra Conclusion. 
 10. See infra notes 129–130 and accompanying text. 
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indication of contingent sovereignty. By extension, this Note also 
argues that UAV DMDP and other emerging practices are pushing 
the world toward a new era of contingent sovereignty. Part I will 
explain the UAV DMDP technology, discuss international 
sovereignty, and introduce the concept of contingent sovereignty. 
Part II will explain the doctrine and development of self-defense 
and show how UAV DMDP constitutes unjustifiable preemptive 
self-defense.11 The Note will conclude by discussing the 
implications of UAV DMDP. 
Because this is a legal Note, discussions of the likely efficacy of 
the program, political checks mitigating the program’s 
implementation, and possible roles of the UN Security Council in 
approving or opposing this program will be left to future 
scholarship. This Note only seeks to establish the legal problems 
UAV DMDP faces, demonstrate that it cannot be justified under 
self-defense, and explain how, if it is used, it will constitute a 
marked step on the path to contingent sovereignty. 
I. UAV DMDP AND SOVEREIGNTY 
A. The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Directed-Energy Missile 
Defense Program 
At any given time, the United States faces serious threats from 
nuclear inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). UAV DMDP 
exists to combat those threats. Currently, eight other states apart 
from the United States have nuclear ICBM capabilities, and half of 
them are hostile toward the United States in some way.12 ICBMs are 
 
 11. Although self-defense is not the only potential legal justification for UAV DMDP, 
it is the strongest. See infra Part II. 
 12. See Nuclear Weapons Worldwide, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 
https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/worldwide (last visited Jan. 14, 2021). The 
world’s nuclear powers include the United States, Russia, France, China, the United 
Kingdom, Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea. Of these countries, Russia, China, 
Pakistan, and North Korea present security concerns, if not outright threats, to the United 
States. See, e.g., Jill Dougherty, Sound the Alarm on Deadly US-Russia Nuclear Threat, CNN  
(Dec. 12, 2019, 1:29 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/12/opinions/new-start-treaty-
dougherty/index.html; Michael Mazza & Henry Sokolski, China’s Nuclear Arms Are a Riddle 
Wrapped in a Mystery, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 13, 2020, 3:43 PM), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/13/china-nuclear-arms-race-mystery/; North Korea 
Threatens US and S Korea with Nuclear Strikes, BBC (Mar. 7, 2016), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35741936; Joshua T. White, The Other Nuclear 
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often kept on hair-trigger alert, meaning they could be launched at 
the United States within seconds or minutes.13 Once launched, 
ICBMs cannot be recalled for any reason, they travel at 15,000 mph 
(nearly 20 times the speed of sound),14 and can accurately strike a 
target from more than 6,000 miles away within about 30 minutes.15 
Additionally, ICBMs have an almost incomprehensible 
destructive power and are specifically designed to frustrate defense 
efforts. First, modern ICBMs are outfitted with multiple nuclear 
warheads that combine to create the most powerful weapons on 
earth.16 When the first atomic weapons were dropped on Japan, 
they each leveled a major city and wrought generational suffering. 
Little Boy, dropped on Hiroshima, killed between 90,000 and 
146,000 people, and Fat Man, dropped on Nagasaki, killed between 
39,000 and 80,000 people.17 Today, atomic weapons are 3,000 times 
more powerful than Little Boy or Fat Man.18  In fact, one modern 
Russian ICBM has the capacity to wipe out all of France or Texas in 
a single blow or, with five or six strikes, destroy the entire U.S. 
East Coast.19 
Second, defense efforts must strike ICBMs at the right time to 
be effective. An ICBM has three stages to its flight path: boost 
 
Threat: America Can’t Escape Its Role in the Conflict Between India and Pakistan, THE ATLANTIC 
(Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/americas-role-india-
pakistan-nuclear-flashpoint/584113/. 
 13. Frequently Asked Questions About Taking Nuclear Weapons Off Hair-Trigger Alert, 
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Jan. 2015), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/ 
default/files/attach/2015/01/Hair-Trigger%20FAQ.pdf. 
 14. Different ICBMs may travel at different speeds and differ in their flight 
capabilities, but the most advanced missiles can travel at this velocity. See Jonathan Marcus, 




 15. Dave Mosher, What Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Are, How They Work, and Why 
the Entire World Fears Them, BUS. INSIDER (July 5, 2017, 11:47 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/intercontinental-ballistic-missiles-science-2017-7. 
 16. Barrie, supra note 5. 
 17. Tom Gillespie, Hell on Earth: What Are Russia’s Satan 2 Nuclear Missiles and Could 
the RS-28 Sarmat Warheads Reach the UK?, THE SUN (Oct. 25, 2017, 12:10 PM), 
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2066898/russias-satan-2-nuclear-missiles-rs-28-sarmat-
warheads-uk/. 
 18. Jay Bennett, Here’s How Much Deadlier Today’s Nukes Are Compared to WWII  
A-Bombs, POPULAR MECHS. (Dec. 13, 2020), https://www.popularmechanics.com/ 
military/a23306/nuclear-bombs-powerful-today/. 
 19. Gillespie, supra note 17. 
4.FORSGREN_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/27/2021  1:49 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:3 (2021) 
852 
 
phase, midcourse, and terminal.20 Of these three stages, only the 
boost phase presents a realistic opportunity to destroy the missile 
entirely because that is the only phase when the missile is moving 
as a slow, compact target that can be easily tracked and hit. Once 
the missile reaches the midcourse phase, countermeasures are 
deployed and the ICBM’s several warheads separate from the 
missile.21 Then, during the terminal phase, each individual 
warhead becomes a moving target and advances very quickly 
along a unique trajectory.22 Furthermore, in a realistic nuclear strike 
situation, multiple ICBMs would be launched with dozens of 
warheads.23 Therefore, the importance of striking these missiles 
while they are compact and vulnerable is critical to successful 
missile defense programs. 
The challenge with missile defense programs is that eliminating 
an ICBM in boost phase is exceedingly difficult. Boost phase only 
lasts between one and five minutes, meaning that any defense 
system would have to be very close to the launchpad or fast enough 
to intercept the ICBM before it reaches its midcourse stage and its 
warheads separate.24 Due to the herculean engineering tasks 
required to construct a defense system capable of destroying an 
ICBM in the first five minutes of flight, boost phase missile defense 
of this sort was unachievable for decades. Now, however, the first 
legitimate means to strike ICBMs in boost phase are emerging 
thanks to years of dedicated work across two disciplines: drones 
and directed-energy weapons. 
For the purposes of this Note, a drone is an aerial, unmanned 
combat machine controlled by a sovereign state. The United States 
has been developing drones for decades. While its early models 
were medium-altitude vehicles used primarily for surveillance,25 
modern drones are designated as “hunter-killer[s]” for their  
 
 20. Ballistic Missile Defense Challenge, MISSILE DEF. AGENCY (Jan. 30, 2004), 
https://media.nti.org/pdfs/10_5.pdf. 
 21. Some ICBMs can carry up to ten warheads that can each hit different targets. 
Mosher, supra note 15. 
 22. MISSILE DEF. AGENCY, supra note 20. 
 23. Barrie, supra note 5. 
 24. A System of Elements, MISSILE DEF. AGENCY, https://www.mda.mil/ 
system/elements.html (last updated June 16, 2020). 
 25. See History of Drone Warfare, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/explainers/history-of-drone-warfare (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2021). 
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high-altitude, long endurance capabilities that, coupled with an 
increased ability to carry heavy weaponry at maximum speeds, 
make for intimidating war machines capable of devastating strikes 
against American enemies.26 
UAV DMDP seeks to capitalize on these recent altitudinal, 
endurance, weight-bearing, and speed developments to create a 
new class of specialized missile defense drones. For UAV DMDP to 
work as well as the government intends, the drones must be able to 
fly 63,000 feet high, stay armed and ready in the strike zones for 
more than thirty-six hours without landing or refueling, have a 
cruising speed of Mach .46 (approximately 350 mph), have a travel 
range of 1,900 miles to a target, and be able to support laser 
weaponry weighing as much as 12,500 pounds.27 Despite this tall 
technological order, these futuristic drones are projected to be 
operational between the years 2021 and 2023.28 
The directed-energy weapons are long-range weapons which 
damage their targets through highly focused energy forms, 
including laser, microwave, and particle beams.29 So far, the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force have begun developing and testing directed 
energy weapons to shoot and destroy small boats, aircraft, or 
missiles.30 Although the generators for these laser systems are often 
heavy and require a great deal of power, they offer significant 
advantages over traditional projectile weapons by offering 
virtually endless rounds of ammunition at much lower cost per 
shot.31 Given the speedy development and clear advantages of the 
directed-energy programs, Robert Afzal―a senior fellow for laser 
 
 26. Carey Dunne, Just How Powerful Is the Reaper Drone?, FAST CO. (July 10, 2014), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3032885/just-how-powerful-is-the-reaper-drone. 
 27. Barrie, supra note 5. 
 28. Id; see also Tyler Rogoway, Missile Defense Agency Seeking a High-Flying Drone for 
“Airborne Laser 2.0”, THE DRIVE (June 14, 2017), https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-
zone/11526/missile-defense-agency-looking-for-high-flying-drone-for-airborne-laser-2-0. 
 29. DOUG BEASON, THE E-BOMB 9 (2005). 
 30. Talal Husseini, HEL on High Water: The Top Navy Laser Weapon Systems,  
NAVAL TECH. (Jan. 30, 2020, 12:24 PM), https://www.naval-technology.com/features/navy-
laser-weapon-systems/; Kyle Mizokami, The U.S. Army Plans to Field the Most Powerful Laser 
Weapon Yet, POPULAR MECHS. (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.popularmechanics.com/ 
military/weapons/a28636854/powerful-laser-weapon/; Andrew Liptak, The US Air Force 
Successfully Tested a Laser System to Shoot Down Missiles, THE VERGE (May 5, 2019, 10:38 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/5/18530089/us-air-force-research-laboratory-shield-
laser-weapons-system-test. 
 31. Mizokami, supra note 30. 
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and sensor systems at Lockheed Martin―has concluded that 
“[w]e’re really at the dawn of an era of the utility of laser 
weapons.”32 These laser weapons, coupled with the revolutionary 
flight and monitoring abilities of modern drones, present the first 
real opportunity for a boost phase missile defense system with 
UAV DMDP. 
UAV DMDP’s concept is simple: “Rather than play defense, . . . 
drones could pre-emptively patrol enemy skies [for ICBM 
threats].”33 The drones, equipped with high altitude and long 
endurance capabilities and laser technology, would hover over 
another state’s ICBM launchpads at a height exceeding 60,000 feet 
for as long as thirty-six hours at a time.34 If at any time an ICBM 
were launched from the territory beneath the drone, it would use 
its directed-energy weapon system to fire a powerful, light-speed 
laser at an ascending missile and destroy it during boost phase.35 
Such technology would provide a sense of national security and 
peace of mind that the United States has not felt since before the 
Cold War; however, achieving such security comes at the cost of 
violating the sovereignty of other countries.36 
Because UAV DMDP exists primarily for boost phase missile 
defense,37 an anti-missile defense system must reach an ICBM 
during the first five minutes of its launch.38 Even rocketing at their 
Mach .46 pace, the drones can only travel at five miles per 
minute―meaning that at a maximum, they could only be  
twenty-five miles away from the ICBM launch pad to possibly be 
able to target, fire, and destroy an ICBM within five minutes.  
 
 32. Philip Perry, The US Military Will Usher in a Widespread Use of Laser Weapons in the 
2020s, BIG THINK (Mar. 21, 2017), https://bigthink.com/philip-perry/the-us-military-plans-
to-usher-in-widespread-use-of-laser-weapons-by-the-2020s. 
 33. Barrie, supra note 5. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Of course, this conclusion assumes the best possible version of UAV DMDP in 
which the state firing an ICBM could not simply shoot down the American drone before 
launching its missiles. Although this Note only analyzes the legal issues associated with 
UAV DMDP and does not analyze its potential for success, it bears mentioning that it will 
likely not be easy to successfully shoot down the drones involved in the UAV DMDP 
program due to their advanced speed, altitude, and weapon capabilities. Additionally, the 
near-hegemonic influence of the United States would also likely serve as a political deterrent 
to shooting down the drones. 
 37. Barrie, supra note 5. 
 38. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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The practical reality of traversing vast, near-continental territories 
like Russia or China to reach a missile within five minutes renders 
this scenario impossible. Even smaller nuclear powers like North 
Korea would still prove to be too large for the drones to reach the 
missiles in time. Accordingly, UAV DMDP can only function if it 
operates in another country’s airspace prior to an ICBM launch. This 
is an undeniably preemptive self-defense tactic, and it conflicts 
with international sovereignty law. 
B. International Law Concerning the Sovereignty of Airspace 
International law is created primarily through treaties and 
custom. Although the international legal regime is fundamentally 
permissive rather than prohibitive,39 state actions that violate 
preexisting treaty agreements or customs are illegal under 
international law. 
One archetypal principle in international law, enshrined 
expressly both in treaties and in custom, is the idea of state 
sovereignty. Indeed, the first guiding principle of the UN Charter 
unequivocally states that the United Nations “is based on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”40 By way of 
definition, sovereignty refers to “the whole body of rights and 
attributes which a State possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of 
all other States, and also in its relation with other States.”41 In other 
words, sovereignty is the right of every country to maintain 
complete and exclusive control of its territory and all its 
domestic affairs.42 
In 1919, the Paris Convention for the Regulation of Aerial 
Navigation established that a state’s sovereignty included 
“complete and exclusive” control of the airspace above  
 
 39. S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). 
(“International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding 
upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by 
usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate 
the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the 
achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore 
be presumed.”). 
 40. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1. 
 41. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9) (individual opinion of  
Judge Alvarez). 
 42. See Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, 1 J. AIR L. 94, 94 (1930). 
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its territory.43 This idea was sustained and expanded by the Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation which created the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and established 
the modern system for regulating civil airspace actions in the 
international community.44 
Later, in 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea45 further clarified the parameters of sovereignty by declaring 
that states’ sovereignty extended to the airspace over their 
territorial sea as well as their land territory.46 This treaty therefore 
provided all the information needed for the horizontal limits  
on a state’s airspace sovereignty, but it did not clarify a vertical 
limit.47 To date, no other international agreement has done so 
either, leaving the vertical limit of a state’s airspace 
sovereignty unsettled.48 
Although the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)49 established that outer space is 
not subject to state sovereignty like airspace is, it did not specify 
where outer space begins and airspace ends—making it difficult to 
establish the exact parameters of vertical sovereign airspace.50 Some 
authorities, like the International Federation of Astronautics, have 
argued that the “Karman Line” that exists at 100 km is the 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Convention on International Civil Aviation - Doc 7300, INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG., 
https://www.icao.int/publications/pages/doc7300.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) 
(defining that the purpose of the ICAO to regulate civil airspace). 
 45. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
 46. Id. at 400 (“This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well 
as to its bed and subsoil.”). 
 47. See generally Dean N. Reinhardt, The Vertical Limit of State Sovereignty, 72 J. AIR L. 
& COM. 65 (2007) (explaining that despite numerous international treaties and scholarly 
suggestions, the vertical limit of state sovereignty remains unsettled). 
 48. Id. at 66 (“Because there is no agreed delineation between a state’s territory and 
free outer space, the vertical limit of state sovereignty is unsettled and each state is left to 
define the limits of its vertical sovereignty. However, no state has explicitly done this.”). 
 49. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.N.: OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS., 
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.ht
ml (last visited Jan. 14, 2021). 
 50. See Reinhardt, supra note 47, at 119–20 (“For instance, the Outer Space Treaty does 
not define space.”). 
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beginning of outer space.51 Conversely, another suggestion 
proposes that airspace sovereignty should have a twelve nautical 
mile limit (just over 22 km).52 Regardless of these opinions and 
recommendations, there is no international consensus on where 
sovereignty-free outer space begins. 
Notwithstanding the confusion over sovereignty’s vertical 
limit, the legal analysis for UAV DMDP operations need not be 
especially concerned with a precise vertical sovereignty limit 
because the drones will only fly at around 63,000 feet (just over 
eighteen kilometers or just under ten nautical miles), well beneath 
where anyone would put the end of airspace sovereignty.53 
Therefore, by all accounts, UAV DMDP will necessarily operate in 
sovereign airspace wherever it is employed. 
Collectively, these treaties stand for the legal realities that 
virtually all flyable airspace over sovereign territory belongs to the 
state that owns the territory, and that no country may legally enter 
the airspace of another country without permission. When state 
actors enter the territory of another sovereign state, the breached 
state’s rights to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter are 
activated. Although there can be some confusion in marginal cases 
over whether minor incursions fall within the UN Charter’s 
provisions on the use of force, there is considerable scholarly 
consensus that “even if it is sometimes difficult to envisage them as 
‘attacks’ in the literal sense—the parameters established in 
customary practice governing forcible responses to such incursions 
 
 51. 100KM Altitude Boundary for Astronautics, FÉDÉRATION AÉRONAUTIQUE 
INTERNATIONALE, https://www.fai.org/page/icare-boundary (last updated June 21, 2004). 
 52. Reinhardt, supra note 47, at 126–27. 
 53. Rogoway, supra note 28 (The Missile Defense Agency is seeking HALE UAV with 
“On-station altitude of greater than 63,000 ft.”). Although the language “greater than 63,000 
ft” only sets an altitudinal floor and technically does not apply a vertical limit, it is well 
understood that it is looking for drones that are capable of reaching that height. High altitude 
drones today fly at a maximum of 60,000–65,000 feet. See Arthur Holland Michel, High 
Altitude Drones, THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE AT BARD COLLEGE (Oct. 15, 2015), 
https://dronecenter.bard.edu/high-altitude-drones/ (“A high-altitude long-endurance 
drone is an unmanned aircraft that flies at altitudes higher than about 60,000 ft. and can 
remain airborne for extremely lengthy periods of time. The Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global 
Hawk . . . which flies at altitudes of up to 65,000 ft. . . . is currently the highest-flying and 
longest-endurance unmanned aircraft to see extensive use.”). 
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are essentially the same as [armed attacks].”54  Indeed, regarding 
aerial incursions specifically, history has shown countries exercise 
lethal force regularly to defend their skies.55 
For example, in July of 1955, an El Al Israel Airlines flight 
traveling from Austria to Turkey was shot down for trespassing in 
Bulgarian airspace, killing fifty-eight people on board.56 Similarly, 
in September of 1983, Soviet fighter jets destroyed a South Korean 
jetliner over the Sea of Japan after it strayed off course into Soviet 
Union airspace, killing all 269 passengers aboard.57 Still more 
examples include Israel downing a Libyan jetliner in 1973 and 
killing 108 people after it wandered fifty miles into Israeli 
airspace,58 Yugoslavia shooting down two American planes for 
being in Yugoslav airspace in 1946,59 and the famous U-2 spy plane 
incident in 1960 in which the Soviet Union shot down American 
pilot Gary Powers for flying over Soviet airspace.60 
These incidents and others,61 coupled with the foregoing treaty 
agreements, show that sovereign states legally need not and 
practically will not tolerate unsanctioned intrusions into their 
airspace.62 Such actions are consistent with a sovereign state’s right 
to defend its complete and exclusive control of its airspace. 
 
 54. TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER 186 (2010); see 
also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE (5th ed. 2012); Albrecht 
Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 123 
(Bruno Simma et al., 2d ed. 2002) (arguing that even incursions not meant to take territory or 
do lasting harm constitute a UN Charter 2(4) violation). 
 55. See generally Farooq Hassan, A Legal Analysis of the Shooting of Korean Airlines Flight 
007 by the Soviet Union, 49 J. AIR L. & COM. 555 (1984) (providing several notable examples of 
states using lethal force against aerial incursions). 
 56. Id. at 568. 
 57. Id. at 555. 
 58. Id. at 569. 
 59. Id. at 570. 
 60. Id. at 582. When Powers was shot down, he was flying at over 70,000 feet, showing 
that states consider even high altitudes to be part of their sovereign airspace. Jason Caffrey, 
Gary Powers: The U-2 Spy Pilot the US Did Not Love, BBC NEWS (Jan. 3, 2016), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35064221. 
 61. See, e.g., RUYS, supra note 54, at 187. 
 62. Of course, like all international incidents, these events gave rise to diplomatic 
discord and claims of illegal behavior. For an in-depth analysis of these kinds of 
disagreements, see Hassan, supra note 55. Notwithstanding the confusion and allegations of 
illegal behavior surrounding these incidents, however, the legal bases for defending 
territorial integrity granted in the UN Charter along with the consistent use of lethal self-
defense by states against unwelcome aircraft creates a pattern (if not a norm) that allows 
states to use lethal force to maintain control of their aerial territory. 
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However, an emerging theory of contingent sovereignty now 
contests this right. 
C. The Theory of Contingent Sovereignty 
Contingent sovereignty is the theory that “sovereign rights and 
immunities are not absolute. They depend on the observance of 
fundamental state obligations.”63 In other words, “statehood itself 
is legally dependent on acceptable government behavior.”64 While 
the idea of “acceptable government behavior” is not new,65 the 
theory of contingent sovereignty takes it much further by positing 
that the consequences for violating state obligations may actually 
include a loss of sovereignty itself.66 Accordingly, if a state ceases 
to act responsibly, then “protections of sovereignty vanish from 
within,” severing the state’s right to non-intervention or invasion 
by another state.67 Therefore, it logically follows that two of the 
most important questions about contingent sovereignty are: 
(1) what kind of state responsibility violations will lead to a loss of 
sovereignty, and (2) who may determine that a state no longer 
deserves its full sovereignty rights? 
First, there are no predetermined actions that automatically 
render a state’s sovereignty rights contingent;68 however, 
contingent sovereignty intervention is most commonly discussed 
in terms of humanitarian intervention or high security concerns like 
 
 63. Stewart Patrick, Sec’y of State Pol’y Plan. Staff, Remarks to the 43rd Annual 
International Affairs Symposium, The Role of the U.S. Government in Humanitarian 
Intervention (Apr. 5, 2004), https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/31299.htm. 
 64. Hurd, supra note 8, at 305. The scholar Stuart Elden first coined the term 
“contingent sovereignty” while discussing the loss of sovereignty norms for countries that 
sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Stuart Elden, Contingent Sovereignty, 
Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders, 26 SAIS REV. OF INT’L AFFS. 11, 14 (2006). 
 65. States have always had obligations, and obligations necessarily carry 
consequences. In fact, since the Peace of Westphalia first legitimized the international system 
of states in 1648, states have had to balance their endowment of power and authority with 
responsibility. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Sovereignty: The Way Ahead, 50 TEX. INT’L L. J. 275, 
280 (2014). This tradition was decidedly sustained by the International Court of Justice in 
1949 when it asserted in the Corfu Channel Case that “[s]overeignty confers rights upon 
States and imposes obligations on them.” Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 
4, 43 (Apr. 9) (individual opinion of Judge Alvarez). 
 66. See Hurd, supra note 8, at 306. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Indeed, it is a paradigm in conflict with the current international legal system.  
See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; U.N. Charter art. 51. 
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terrorism or weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).69 Because this 
Note focuses on the United States defending itself from missile 
threats, only the security concerns will be addressed.   
Second, contingent sovereignty only exists when a state or 
states operate in a different, nonconsenting state without UN 
approval. If a state gives consent for intervention, there cannot be a 
sovereignty violation because consent itself “is a manifestation of 
the ‘sovereign equality’ of states,” and the fact that “a state can 
consent to acts otherwise contrary to its sovereignty is recognisable 
broadly within international law.”70 Furthermore, any action 
approved by the UN does not render sovereignty contingent 
because nearly every state in the world has already consented to 
the terms of the UN Charter, which has provisions allowing it to 
violate state sovereignty by “tak[ing] at any time such action as it 
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.”71 Furthermore, those few states that have not 
consented are still bound to the terms of the Charter through 
customary international law.72 In other words, a state’s sovereignty 
 
 69. For examples of humanitarian treatment of contingent sovereignty, see Keith A. 
Petty, Humanity and National Security: The Law of Mass Atrocity Response Operations, 34 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 745 (2013); Hurd, supra note 8, at 21; Hallie Ludsin, Returning Sovereignty to the 
People, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 97 (2013). While much of the discussion around security-
based contingent sovereignty focuses on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the 
questions of contingent sovereignty could logically extend to cover other security interests, 
like the emerging threats of cyber security. See generally Jensen, supra note 65. 
 70. Max Byrne, Consent and the Use of Force: An Examination of ‘Intervention by Invitation’ 
as a Basis for US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, 3 J. ON USE FORCE & INT’L L. 97, 
99–100 (2016). 
 71. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 72. See Norman G. Printer, Jr., The Use of Force Against Non-state Actors Under 
International Law: An Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in Yemen, 8 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN 
AFFS. 331, 339–40 (“The use of force regime outlined [in the UN Charter] is recognized as 
customary international law, meaning that it is binding upon all states, even those few states 
that do not belong to the UN. Although it is still debated whether the Charter intended to 
codify customary international law as of the Charter’s inception, it is undisputed that all 
states are bound by the document’s norms.”). Additionally, the Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law states “[i]t is generally accepted that the principles of the United 
Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force have the character of jus cogens,” which means 
“the international community of states” recognizes these principles “as peremptory, 
permitting no derogation. These rules prevail over and invalidate international agreements 
and other rules of international law in conflict with them. Such a peremptory norm is subject 
to modification only by a subsequent norm of international law having the same character.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. K (internal citations omitted); 
see also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 94, 96–97 (June 27) 
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cannot be violated by an invited state’s interference or by UN 
interference because the sovereign state has consented to such 
action in either case. 
The inquiry into contingent sovereignty in this Note looks  
to UAV DMDP because it is a program that has neither  
been consented to by any other state nor approved by the  
UN Security Council. Therefore, if the United States proceeds  
with UAV DMDP, it will functionally decide that its security 
interests of nuclear defense outweigh the sovereignty rights of 
states capable of launching nuclear attacks—a clear example of 
contingent sovereignty. 
D. International Acceptance of Contingent Sovereignty 
UAV DMDP would arguably be the first US program to adhere 
to a theory of contingent sovereignty, but the idea of pursuing 
policies resembling contingent sovereignty has existed among 
prominent experts for some time. For example, according to 
Richard N. Haass―who is the current President of the Council on 
Foreign Relations, previous Director of Policy Planning in Colin 
Powell’s State Department, and previous member of the Carter, 
Reagan, and George H. W. Bush administrations―sovereignty 
rights come with obligations that specifically prohibit states from 
supporting terrorism or pursuing WMDs.73 In Haass’s words from 
2002, “sovereignty does not grant governments a blank check to do 
whatever they like within their own borders.”74 
Additionally, Philip Zelikow, who served as the executive 
director of the 9/11 Commission and wrote the 2002 United States 
National Security Strategy, published a 1998 report describing a 
world order that seems to adopt the theory of contingent 
sovereignty.75 In Zelikow’s words: 
International norms should adapt so that . . . states are obliged to 
reassure those who are worried and to take reasonable measures 
to prove they are not secretly developing weapons of mass 
 
(Merits) (applying customary international law instead of multilateral treaties like the U.N. 
Charter). 
 73. Elden, supra note 64, at 15. 
 74. Id. (quoting Richard N. Haass, Dir. of the Off. of Pol’y Plan. Staff US Dep’t of State, 
The 2002 Arthur Ross Lecture, Remarks to Foreign Policy Association: Defining U.S. Foreign 
Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World (April 22, 2002)). 
 75. Id. at 14–15. 
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destruction. Failure to supply such proof, or prosecute the 
criminals living in their borders, should entitle worried nations to 
take all necessary actions for their self-defense.76 
These statements from Haass and Zelikow jointly propose a 
foreign policy that looks something like the following: if a state is 
worried about another state’s terroristic or WMD activity, it may 
take “all necessary actions” for its self-defense, regardless of 
sovereignty considerations. Such an approach resembles the 
preemptive self-defense prohibited by the UN Charter―showing 
how preemptive self-defense may in fact be considered a 
manifestation of contingent sovereignty.77 
Despite the implicit support for contingent sovereignty that 
may exist in statements like those from Haass and Zelikow, 
contingent sovereignty is hardly an accepted doctrine in the 
international community. In a 2002 speech by former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan regarding intervention in Iraq, Annan 
reaffirmed that “[a]ny State, if attacked, retains the inherent right 
of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. But beyond that, 
when States decide to use force to deal with broader threats to 
international peace and security, there is no substitute for the 
unique legitimacy provided by the United Nations.”78 
While much has changed since 2002, the prevailing view still 
favors Secretary-General Annan’s view over Philip Zelikow’s 
opinion. In 2016, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon spoke about the 
UN’s growing focus on preventing genocide and crimes against 
humanity, and stated that although such efforts by the UN may feel 
as though they undermine state sovereignty, the United Nations’ 
engagement with member states will be “based on cooperation, 
transparency[,] and respect for sovereignty,” and that the UN 
“seeks to reinforce sovereignty, not challenge or undermine it.”79 
 
 76. Id. (quoting ASHTON B. CARTER, JOHN M. DEUTCH & PHILIP D. ZELIKOW, 
CATASTROPHIC TERRORISM: ELEMENTS OF A NATIONAL POLICY (1998)). 
 77. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4; U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 78. Press Release, United Nations, When Force is Considered, There is No Substitute 
for Legitimacy Provided by United Nations, Secretary-General Says in General Assembly 
Address (Sept. 12, 2002), https://www.un.org/press/en/2002/SGSM8378.doc.htm. 
 79. Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, Remarks at Security Council Open Debate 
on Respect for the Principles and Purposes of the Charter as a Key Element for the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Feb. 15, 2016), 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2016-02-15/secretary-generals-
remarks-security-council-open-debate-respect. 
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More recently, in September of 2019, the UN General Assembly 
spoke so extensively about sovereignty concerns that a UN press 
release summarized the general theme of the arguments as: 
“International peace and security are gravely threatened when 
national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity—
principles on which the United Nations was founded—are 
undermined and violated.”80 From these statements and others, it 
would seem that the notion of contingent sovereignty has won few 
vocal converts in the international community. 
Given the global opposition to the idea of contingent 
sovereignty, how can the United States justify UAV DMDP,  
which not only infringes upon sovereignty, but completely  
ignores it? After all, maintaining an indefinite military presence  
in another country’s airspace is an unprecedented suggestion  
that breaks rank with even the strongest statements favoring 
contingent sovereignty. 
The answer is the United States can either persuasively justify 
UAV DMDP under the current sovereignty framework or, 
alternatively, completely embrace a new theory of contingent 
sovereignty. In other words, if UAV DMDP cannot be fully excused 
under the current framework, it necessarily constitutes a giant, 
perhaps irreversible, step toward a new paradigm of contingent 
sovereignty in international law.   
II. SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The best argument to justify UAV DMDP is self-defense. 
Although self-defense is not the only potential legal justification for 
UAV DMDP, it is the strongest. While other justifications such as 
consent, armed conflict, countermeasures, and necessity arguments 
warrant discussion as well, it is unlikely that any of these 
justifications would result in an outcome any different from that of 
self-defense. For the sake of brevity and efficiency, this Note will 
limit its discussion of justifications for UAV DMDP to self-defense. 
Self-defense is an ancient, archetypal right of every state. When 
the United Nations Charter was written, it sought to advance a new 
world order of peaceful coexistence among equally sovereign 
 
 80. Press Release, United Nations, World Leaders Denounce Breaches of Sovereignty 
in Collective Efforts to Settle Conflict, Tackle Climate Change, as General Assembly Debate 
Continues (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12187.doc.htm. 
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nation states―a mission it made clear by listing sovereign equality 
as its very first guiding principle in the Charter.81 However, the idea 
of sovereign equality had to be reconciled with the “inherent right” 
states already had to self-defense.82 The result was Article 51 of the 
UN Charter, which sustains the principle of sovereign equality, but 
emphasizes that nothing “shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations.”83 The practical result of 
the reconciliation between sovereign equality and self-defense is an 
international system in which all states must respect one another’s 
sovereignty unless they are acting to repel an armed attack. 
This system prompts the questions, what constitutes an armed 
attack, and when can self-defense be used to prevent an  
armed attack? The answers to these questions are still unsettled. In 
broad terms, these questions hinge on whether an attack is 
anticipatory or preemptive. For the purposes of this Note, 
anticipatory self-defense refers to the type of defense described by 
the Caroline standard and covered by Article 51, and preemptive 
self-defense is self-defense that responds to threats that are not 
imminent according to the Caroline standard.84 Anticipatory self-
defense is lawful defensive force used against an imminent armed 
attack whereas preemptive self-defense is unlawful defensive force 
used against a non-imminent threat of an armed attack. 
The majority of the international community agrees that 
anticipatory self-defense is included in the meaning of the text of 
Article 51; however, preemptive force is much more likely to fall 
outside the meaning of the text and therefore violate the 
provision.85 While some states and international lawyers argue that 
 
 81. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1. 
 82. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 83. Id. 
 84. While there are three broadly recognized and debated types of self-defense, the 
terms are used by various scholars to refer to differing principles. For this Note, preemptive 
self-defense’s often-used other term of “preventive self-defense” will not be used. 
Additionally, interceptive self-defense, the third type of self-defense, will not be discussed 
in this Note. While interceptive self-defense could add a beneficial perspective to the 
discussion, it likely will not affect the overall outcome and the confines of this Note do not 
allot for its treatment. For treatment of interceptive self-defense, see DINSTEIN, supra note 54. 
 85. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS 
AND ARMED ATTACKS 107 (2002) (“States seem willing to accept strong evidence of the 
imminence of an overpowering attack as tantamount to the attack itself, allowing a 
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preemptive self-defense should be considered legitimate, Professor 
Sean Murphy points out that “[t]o date, . . . no authoritative 
decision-maker within the international community has taken a 
position on whether preemptive self-defense is permissible under 
international law, or whether it is permissible but only under 
certain conditions.”86 
Accordingly, for the United States to justify UAV DMDP as  
self-defense, it must convincingly demonstrate that state practice in 
the international community has moved the standard for legitimate 
self-defense away from anticipatory self-defense and into the realm 
of preemptive self-defense. If it cannot, then UAV DMDP breaches 
international legal standards and represents a deviant move 
toward contingent sovereignty. 
In modern history, there are certain events which color the 
discussion on imminence and provide insight into the parameters 
of internationally legal preemptive self-defense actions. Beginning 
with the foundational Caroline affair, this Part tracks the historical 
development of “imminence” in the international community, 
discusses how it is currently understood, and shows that UAV 
DMDP cannot be justified according to that understanding. 
A. The Caroline Era of Anticipatory Self-Defense 
Conceptual understanding of anticipatory self-defense begins 
with the Caroline test.87 The Caroline test is derived from an incident 
between the United States and Britain during the Canadian 
Rebellion of 1837.88 At that time, a newly formed, pro-Canada 
American force began harassing British soldiers along the Niagara 
River between Canada and the United States.89 Among these forces 
was a steamboat called the Caroline which ferried supplies and 
reinforcements across the river to the rebels in Canada.90 
 
demonstrably threatened state to respond under Article 51 as if the attack had already 
occurred, or at least to treat such circumstances, when demonstrated, as mitigating the 
system’s judgment of the threatened state’s pre-emptive response.”). 
 86. Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699,  
702 (2005). 
 87. John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 741 (2004). 
 88. John Dever & James Dever, Cyberwarfare: Attribution, Preemption, and National Self 
Defense, 2 J. L. & CYBER WARFARE 25, 39–40 (2013). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 41. 
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Considering the Caroline’s capacity to strengthen and transport the 
rebel forces, the British militia in Canada determined the Caroline 
should be destroyed even though it was moored in 
American waters.91 
The British troops boarded the Caroline, killed two Americans, 
set the ship on fire, and sent it over the edge of Niagara Falls.92 In 
response to vehement American condemnation of the attack, the 
British justified their actions by claiming they acted in self-defense. 
In response, Daniel Webster, who was the Secretary of State of the 
United States, asserted in an official letter that self-defense against 
imminent attacks may only take place when there is “a necessity of 
self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment for deliberation.”93 
From the time Secretary Webster penned his letter to the 
passage of the UN Charter, the Caroline test enjoyed rare popularity 
and legitimacy. Hailed as the “seminal definition”94 of permissible 
use of anticipatory force and lauded for having a “mythical 
status”95 as a definition of imminence, the Caroline test went on to 
be adopted by the International Military Tribunal in the 
Nuremberg trials and even survived the adoption of the UN 
Charter in 1945.96 Truly, the Caroline test is a foundational doctrine 
of anticipatory self-defense. 
Yet, despite its pioneering role in defining anticipatory self-
defense, the Caroline test is not without controversy. The principal 
debate regarding the Caroline test today asks whether it is poorly 
tailored to states’ needs in an era of modern warfare, prompting 
some to argue that “such a parochial perspective could be 
 
 91. Id. at 41–42. 
 92. Id. at 42. 
 93. Daniel Webster, Case of the Caroline, 63 NILES’ NAT’L REG., Sept. 24, 1842, at 58. 
Webster also discussed the need for proportionality in self-defense attacks, but because this 
Note deals with mere neutralizing force used against WMD capable of killing millions, 
proportionality is not of great relevance. 
 94. Dever & Dever, supra note 88, at 47. 
 95. Id. at 48 (“Indeed, as Professor Christine Gray remarked in 2000, the Caroline test 
has attained a mythical status not only for its definition of imminence but also for its 
requirement that the use of force be necessary and proportional to a coming attack.”) 
(referencing CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 105  
(Oxford 2000)). 
 96. Yoo, supra note 87, at 741. 
4.FORSGREN_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/27/2021  1:49 AM 
867 Death Star Drones 
 867 
 
disastrous in a thermonuclear age riven by terrorist acts and rogue 
nation states.”97 
In response, adherents to the Caroline standard claim that 
expanding the meaning of Article 51 to meet these threats 
constitutes preemptive self-defense, which “would place the law on 
a very slippery slope, taking us back into the pre-Charter world in 
which nations resorted to warfare for ‘just’ causes.”98 Before 9/11, 
this debate emerged prominently in two notable events: the 1981 
Israeli attack on Iraq and the 1986 American attack on Libya.99  
On June 7, 1981, Israel conducted an air strike on Iraq and 
destroyed the construction site of a French-supplied nuclear 
reactor.100 To justify this blatant violation of sovereignty and armed 
attack against Iraq, Israel invoked a self-defense argument claiming 
it had been concerned for several years that the nuclear program 
would produce weapons, and that it only attacked to prevent Iraq 
from using nuclear weapons against Israel.101 Although subsequent 
evidence gathered by the international community revealed that it 
was truly Iraq’s intention to build nuclear weapons, it remained 
unclear if Iraq intended to actually use them.102 Additionally, the 
same intelligence showed that Iraq lacked the means to create any 
such weapons for another twelve to eighteen months.103 
Notwithstanding the valid threat that the nuclear facility could 
pose to Israel, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 487 which “strongly condemn[ed] the military attack by 
Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
norms of international conduct,” and “[c]all[ed] upon Israel to 
refrain in the future from any such acts or threats thereof.”104 
 
 97. Dever & Dever, supra note 88, at 48; see also MICHAEL W. DOYLE, STRIKING FIRST: 
PREEMPTION AND PREVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 15 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2008). 
 98. Murphy, supra note 86, at 714. 
 99. While there are other examples which could be included in this discussion―like 
the 1967 Six-Day War, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 
Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161 (May 2004), or Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27)―only the most 
relevant examples could be included within the limits of this Note. 
 100. Donald R. Rothwell, Anticipatory Self-Defence in the Age of International Terrorism, 
24 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 337, 343 (2005). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. S.C. Res. 487 (June 19, 1981). 
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Israel’s attack on Iraq demonstrates that in 1981 the 
international community would not tolerate a strike carried out 
twelve to eighteen months in advance of an attack that was not 
certain to occur. Although Israel sought to justify its actions 
through self-defense, it failed to produce any clear state practice 
supporting its interpretation of self-defense and could not rebut the 
accusations that it had acted before exhausting other peaceful 
means of resolving the problem.105 
Five years after Israel’s attack on Iraq, the limits of anticipatory 
force were again questioned on the world stage. On April 5, 1986, a 
Libyan national carried out a terrorist attack on a popular nightclub 
in Berlin that killed two and wounded seventy-nine Americans, 
among other victims. Because the terrorist was presumably acting 
under the orders of Libya’s head of state, Muammar al-Gaddafi, the 
United States responded ten days later by invading Libya’s 
sovereign airspace and bombing three targets in Tripoli and two 
near Benghazi.106 
Unlike a traditional exercise of anticipatory self-defense, the 
United States did not claim it was repelling any kind of imminent 
attack. Instead, it claimed its defensive force was justified by “clear 
evidence that Libya [was] planning future attacks,”107 and because 
“preemptive action against his terrorist installations will not only 
diminish Colonel [Gaddafi’s] capacity to export terror, it will 
provide him with incentives . . . to alter his criminal behavior.”108 In 
other words, the United States was asserting that the doctrine of 
self-defense legitimized not only uses of force to repel an incoming 
attack but also uses of force aimed at preventing indeterminate 
future attacks and deterring terrorists as well. 
Although this claim by the United States departed markedly 
from the Caroline test and resembled Israel’s preemptive action 
 
 105. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 173 (Oxford, 4th ed., 
2018). 
 106. Rothwell, supra note 100, at 344. 
 107. Larry M. Speakes, Principal Deputy Press Sec’y, Statement on the United States 
Air Strike Against Libya (Apr. 14, 1986), in RONALD REAGAN PRES’L LIBR.: PUB. PAPERS PRES. 
RONALD REAGAN, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-principal-
deputy-press-secretary-speakes-united-states-air-strike-0 (last visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
 108. Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against 
Libya (Apr. 14, 1986), in RONALD REAGAN PRES’L LIBR.: PUB. PAPERS PRES. RONALD REAGAN,  
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-united-states-air-strike-
against-libya (last visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
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decried by the UN in 1981, there was not as much fallout resulting 
from the United States’ actions. There was no Security Council 
resolution or International Court of Justice case condemning the act 
as illegal,109 and thus the United States did not need to actively 
defend its anticipatory action by showing state practice. 
Consequently, the world was left with mixed precedent: the armed 
attack against Iraq twelve to eighteen months prior to their 
anticipated use of nuclear weapons was not acceptable, but an 
attack launched to deter Libya from unspecified future attacks did 
not receive the same level of condemnation. 
While the world was still operating under the Caroline test at 
this time, it was arguably in Libya that the first seeds of preemptive 
self-defense and contingent sovereignty appear, as well as the 
evident disparity in self-defense justifications between world 
powers like the United States and lesser powers like Israel―themes 
that became incredibly important when the world changed forever 
on September 11, 2001. 
B. 9/11 and Preemptive Self-Defense 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted the most important 
developments in international self-defense law since the ratification 
of the UN Charter. Following the infamous attacks by the Al-Qaeda 
network—which destroyed the World Trade Center in New York 
City, collapsed the west wing of the Pentagon in Virginia, and 
caused the deaths of nearly 3,000 people110—the United States 
responded swiftly, causing the world to reevaluate what actions are 
included in the self-defense justification under Article 51. 
Among the United States’ responses to 9/11 was the 2002 
National Security Strategy, which specifically declared the United 
States’ view of a more expansive self-defense doctrine under 
international law.111 In what has subsequently been coined as the 
Bush Doctrine, President George W. Bush’s administration 
declared that the United States’ right of self-defense went beyond 
 
 109. Rothwell, supra note 100, at 345. 
 110. Peter L. Bergen, September 11 Attacks, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Sept. 10, 2020), 
https://www.britannica.com/event/September-11-attacks. 
 111. WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA (2002), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. 
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anticipatory self-defense and allowed it to act preemptively against 
terrorists stating: 
 The United States has long maintained the option of 
preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national 
security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—
and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to 
defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and 
place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile 
acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act 
preemptively.112  
Notably, the United States specifically discussed the existing 
right to anticipatory self-defense but refuted the Caroline standard 
of instant and overwhelming attacks by asserting that legitimate 
anticipatory action may be taken “even if uncertainty remains as to 
the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”113 The National Security 
Strategy further undermined the Caroline test by expressly 
declaring the new age of rogue states and terrorists left the United 
States no option but to reject the limited “reactive posture” of the 
past114 and suggesting that “[i]n particular the requirement that a 
threat be imminent needs to be revisited.”115 Breaking rank with all 
preceding self-defense doctrines in its bald assertion of a right to 
 
 112. Id. at 15. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. GRAY, supra note 105, at 249–50. Since then, the United States has indeed updated 
its definition of imminence. The United States now uses the following framework for 
imminence analysis: 
“the nature and immediacy of the threat; the probability of an attack; whether the 
anticipated attack is part of a concerted pattern of continuing armed activity; the 
likely scale of the attack and the injury, loss, or damage likely to result therefrom 
in the absence of mitigating action; and the likelihood that there will be other 
opportunities to undertake effective action in self-defense that may be expected to 
cause less serious collateral injury, loss, or damage. . . . [T]he absence of specific 
evidence of where an attack will take place or of the precise nature of an attack 
does not preclude a conclusion that an armed attack is imminent for purposes of 
the exercise of the right of self-defense, provided that there is a reasonable and 
objective basis for concluding that an armed attack is imminent.” Finally, as is now 
increasingly recognized by the international community, the traditional 
conception of what constitutes an “imminent” attack must be understood in light 
of the modern-day capabilities, techniques, and technological innovations of 
terrorist organizations.  
WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED 
STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 9 (2016), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5847db914.html (internal citations omitted). 
4.FORSGREN_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/27/2021  1:49 AM 
871 Death Star Drones 
 871 
 
preemptive force, the Bush Doctrine’s acceptance by the 
international community would be immediately tested in the  
Iraq War. 
On March 19, 2003, the United States invaded Iraq to prevent 
its acquisition and use of WMDs against the United States.116 
Although it is debated whether this was the true motive, it is 
undisputed that there was no imminent threat from Iraq against the 
United States as defined by the Caroline test. In fact, the United 
States’ own National Intelligence Council reported in 2002 that 
“Iraq . . . if left unchecked . . . probably will have a nuclear weapon 
during this decade.”117 
Given its demonstrable lack of imminence and clear deviance 
from earlier questions of anticipatory self-defense in international 
law, the Iraq war is arguably the first modern preemptive war—
something that, under the UN Charter, would traditionally be 
considered illegal.118 Yet, notwithstanding these problems, the 
United States garnered an international coalition of forty-nine 
countries supporting the war effort and set an enduring example of 
using preemptive self-defense to justify a major and lasting 
invasion against another sovereign state.119 
Since the U.S. authorized military action in Iraq, other states 
likewise have adopted policies which arguably support preemptive 
self-defense theories. For example, although Russia was critical of 
the Iraq invasion, its quarrel was with the application  
of preemptive force and not with the theory of preemptive  
 
 116. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR (2003), https://2001-
2009.state.gov/documents/organization/24172.pdf. 
 117. NAT’L FOREIGN INTEL. BD., IRAQ’S CONTINUING PROGRAMS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION 5 (2002), https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/iraq/iraq-wmd-
nie-01-2015.pdf (emphasis added). 
 118. But see Murphy, supra note 86, at 730–31. (“[T]he United States did not assert that 
the invasion of Iraq was permissible under international law because of an evolved right of 
preemptive self-defense. Rather, the United States asserted that the invasion was lawful 
because it was authorized by the Security Council, a theory also maintained by the other 
members of the U.S.-led coalition. At most, it seems that some of the U.S. government’s 
statements on the legality of the action contained cryptic references suggesting legal 
authority other than that emanating from Security Council resolutions, but the terms 
‘anticipatory self-defense’ or ‘preemptive self-defense’ are never used. Consequently, it is no 
surprise that some international lawyers believe that the invasion of Iraq provides no 
precedent for a right of preemptive self-defense, but others assert that it does.”). 
 119. For an explanation on why a coalition such as this is legally significant, see the 
discussion on international law creation through state action and opinio juris, infra 
Section II.C. 
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force generally.120 In fact, in 2008 the Russian military Chief of Staff 
General Yuri Baluyevsky asserted Russia’s dedication to the idea of 
preemptive self-defense by declaring, “We have no plans to attack 
anyone, but . . .  to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of Russia and its allies, military forces will be used, including 
preventively, including with the use of nuclear weapons.”121 This 
blatant endorsement of preemptive self-defense leaves little 
question on Russia’s stance regarding preemptive self-defense. 
Similarly, despite initially condemning the invasion of Iraq,122 
the Indian government has also adopted preemptive approaches to 
self-defense. For example, in 2002 the Indian Finance Minister 
Jaswant Singh described India’s stance on preemptive self-defense 
while on a trip to Washington, D.C. by stating: “Preemption or 
prevention is inherent in deterrence. Where there is deterrence 
there is preemption. The same thing is there in Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter. Every nation has that right. . . . 
Preemption is the right of any nation to prevent injury to itself.”123 
This theme was reiterated the next year by Foreign Minister 
Yashwant Sinha who declared, “[T]he international community 
must realize that India has a much better case to go for preemptive 
action against Pakistan than the US has in Iraq.”124 As early as April 
of 2004, the Indian government extended these ideas to its military 
policy by embracing the “Cold Start” doctrine—a renewed military 
policy that embraced a posture of “proactive deterrence” with 
“offensive bias.”125 
Lastly, it bears mentioning that some scholars have pointed to 
the growing state practice of targeted drone strikes as a form of 
preemptive warfare.126 While such programs may exercise lethal 
 
 120. See Kerstin Fisk & Jennifer M. Ramos, Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Preventive 
Self-Defense as a Cascading Norm, 15 INT’L STUDS. PERSPS. 163, 175 (2014). 
 121. Id. at 176 (emphasis added) (quoting Russia Could Use Nuclear Weapons as Preventive 
Measure to Thwart Major Threat, Official Says, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 19, 2008), 
https://www.foxnews.com/story/russia-could-use-nuclear-weapons-as-preventive-
measure-to-thwart-major-threat-official-says.amp). 
 122. Id. at 172. 
 123. Id. at 173. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 173–74. 
 126. As Fisk and Ramos point out, the modern drone program is now able to take lethal 
action against ambiguous threats like suspected militants with unconfirmed identities who 
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preemptive force in non-consenting countries, the justification for 
such programs is usually based in the armed conflict doctrine 
rather than self-defense. For example, although the United States 
uses its well-known “unwilling or unable” doctrine to justify 
sending Reaper drones into countries which are unwilling or 
unable to eliminate internal terrorist threats,127 it does so under the 
auspices of the war on terror―an armed conflict duly sanctioned by 
the U.S. Congress in the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF) in 2001.128 Therefore, these matters are beyond the scope 
of preemptive self-defense. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Bush Doctrine, the Iraq War, 
Russia’s claim to a right of preemptive strikes, and India’s 
incorporation of preemptive self-defense into its military policy 
seem to indicate an emerging state practice of preemptive self-
defense, or at least a standard much different from the Caroline test. 
However, on their own they do not overcome the status quo. For 
the United States to justify UAV DMDP under self-defense, it 
would have to show that under customary international law, these 
state practices are not new exceptions but the accepted norm.  
The following section explains why the United States fails in  
its arguments that customary international law includes 
these practices. 
 
are targeted for suspicious “patterns of life.” In 2013, United States senior officials admitted 
that dozens of these strikes had been committed against low-ranking fighters or foot soldiers 
who presented no high-level threats, but “would have been future leaders” if they had been 
left alive. Kerstin Fisk & Jennifer M. Ramos, Introduction: The Preventive Force Continuum, in 
PREVENTIVE FORCE: DRONES, TARGETED KILLING, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CONTEMPORARY WARFARE 1, 9–10 (Kerstin Fisk & Jennifer M. Ramos eds., 2016). 
 127. Letter dated 23 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United 
States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (Sept. 23, 2014), 
http://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2014/695. This letter is largely viewed as a 
watershed moment for the “unwilling or unable” doctrine; however, it was not the first 
instance of the idea. For example, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams once wrote to the 
Spanish government informing it that if it were unable to prevent cross-border incursions 
against America from Creeks, Seminoles, and escaped slaves in Spanish Florida, then the 
United States would invade and claim Florida for itself. Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo,  
The “Bush Doctrine”: Can Preventive War Be Justified?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 843,  
851–52 (2009). 
 128. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted). 
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C. The Current Law of Self-Defense Cannot Justify UAV DMDP 
Considering the development and current state of “imminence” 
under international law, the United States will likely fail to justify 
UAV DMDP under a theory of anticipatory defense. Because UAV 
DMDP must operative preemptively,129 justifying it requires the 
United States to show that customary international law has 
legitimized preemptive self-defense in accordance with Article 51. 
It has not. 
Preliminarily, customary international law is generated by the 
combination of two elements: state practice and opinio juris. State 
practice refers to behaviors of sovereign states that are widespread 
and representative, and opinio juris refers to a state’s recognition 
that those behaviors were carried out as legal obligations. Despite 
state practice’s straightforward definition, it can be exceedingly 
difficult to establish. As one author phrased it: 
Scholars have debated what kind of activity constitutes state 
practice and disagree on the duration and frequency of the 
activity that is necessary to satisfy the definition. Further, it seems 
practically impossible to ascertain the practices of the nearly 200 
states in the international community. Thus, a survey of 
customary international law is often highly selective and takes 
into account only major powers and the most affected states. But 
even in this smaller focus there is no adequate and systematic 
method for proving the elements of custom. Consequently, 
international law arguments based on custom always suffer from 
a considerable degree of arbitrariness.130 
Likewise, while it may seem easier to establish opinio juris in 
theory, states tend to be minimalistic and guarded in public 
statements on controversial international legal theories which may 
contradict their interests later. Accordingly, explicit statements on 
a given state’s position on emerging norms of preemptive force will 
be few and far between. Given the “considerable degree of 
arbitrariness” in the analysis of state practice and the rarity of 
definitive opinio juris statements, it is unsurprising that there is not 
sufficient support for the United States to argue that preemptive 
self-defense has become customary international law. 
 
 129. Supra Part I. 
 130. Niels Petersen, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role of State 
Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 275, 276–77 (2008). 
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First, the world’s overwhelmingly negative response to Israel 
preemptively attacking an Iraqi nuclear plant in 1981 clearly shows 
that exercising preemptive self-defense against non-imminent 
threats of nuclear weapons is opposed by state practice and the 
opinio juris of states.131 UAV DMDP is designed to prevent nuclear 
weapons from ever becoming threats, not respond to active or 
imminent nuclear threats.132 If undisputed intelligence showing 
Iraq’s intent to launch a nuclear weapon at Israel was insufficient 
to constitute an imminent armed attack because it could not happen 
for twelve to eighteen months, how much less imminent is an attack 
against the United States that has not been threatened at all?133   
Second, although some select state actions and declarations 
following 9/11 endorse preemptive self-defense,134 they do not 
amount to customary international law. The only event on a big 
enough scale which the United States could argue established a 
new norm of preemptive self-defense is the Iraq War. However, 
due to the divisive and limited nature of that war, it fails to establish 
such a custom. 
The coalition in support of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 consisted 
of forty-nine countries.135 This figure accounted for nearly a fourth 
of the members of the United Nations and included influential 
states like the United Kingdom, Japan, and South Korea. As the 
United States portrayed the coalition: “The population of Coalition 
countries is approximately 1.23 billion people. Coalition countries 
have a combined GDP of approximately $22 trillion. Every major 
race, religion, ethnicity in the world is represented. The Coalition 
includes nations from every continent on the globe.”136 
Yet, while the membership of the coalition seems to have 
widespread and representative elements, it does not definitively 
establish state practice. Notably absent from the coalition are the 
 
 131. See supra notes 100–105 and accompanying text; Rothwell, supra note 100, at 343–
44. 
 132. See Barrie, supra note 5. 
 133. See Rothwell, supra note 100, at 343–44. 
 134. Supra Sections II.B–C (presenting the Bush Doctrine, Russia’s claim to a right of 
preemptive strikes, India’s incorporation of preemptive self-defense into its military policy, 
and preemptive strikes by Israel and the United States as evidence of countries embracing 
preemptive self-defense). 
 135. Who are the Current Coalition Members?, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 27, 2003), 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/news/20030327-10.html. 
 136. Id. 
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remaining three members of the UN Security Council—namely, 
France, China, and Russia.137 These countries, along with almost the 
entire Arab League, the African Union, Germany, Canada, Mexico, 
Brazil, and several others, opposed the invasion.138 Consequently, 
if it can be said that there was widespread and representative 
support of the invasion, it can also be said that there was 
widespread and representative condemnation of the invasion. 
Moreover, even if there were established state practice 
supporting the Iraq invasion, that support would not necessarily 
indicate state practice in support of preemptive force. In fact, 
according to Claus Kreß, “the ‘coalition of the willing’ did not rely 
on a claim of a broadened right of anticipatory self-defence in order 
to justify the lawfulness of the use of force in Iraq.”139 Additionally, 
some members of the coalition have explicitly stated that the rights 
of self-defense do not extend to preemptive self-defense.140 
Drawing from these examples and others, it certainly seems the 
current state of international law does not accept the idea of 
preemptive self-defense even with the Iraq War coalition. In fact, 
even scholars who advocate for the possibility that the law is 
evolving toward such acceptance concede that “there is insufficient 
evidence to say with certainty” that the law currently accepts such 
 
 137. See id. 
 138. See Arab States Line Up Behind Iraq, BBC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2003, 04:09 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2882851.stm; Africans Back France on Iraq, CNN 
(Feb. 21, 2003, 2:49 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/02/20/ 
africa.summit/index.html; France and Allies Rally Against War, BBC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2003, 7:24 
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2821145.stm; Tim Harper, Canadians Back 
Chrétien on War, Poll Finds, TORONTO STAR (Mar. 22, 2003), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110706184537/http://25461.vws.magma.ca/admin/articl
es/torstar-24-03-2003c.html; Maggie Farley & Richard Boudreaux, Mexico’s Envoy to U.N. 
Leaves, with Defiance, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2003, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-nov-22-fg-zinser22-story.html; Brazil: 
Iraq, U.S. Guilty of ‘Disrespect’, NEWSMAX.COM (Mar. 20, 2003), 
https://archive.ph/20120904171112/http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/
3/19/211836.shtml#selection-419.0-419.41. 
 139. Claus Kreß, The State Conduct Element, in 1 THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: A 
COMMENTARY 412, 475 (Claus Kreß & Stefan Barriga eds., 2017). 
 140. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE GOVERNMENT’S POLICY ON THE USE OF 
DRONES FOR TARGETED KILLING, 2015–16, HL 141, HC 574, at 45 (UK),  
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201516/jtselect/jtrights/574/574.pdf 
(“[I]nternational law permits the use of force in self-defence against an imminent attack  
but does not authorise the use of force to mount a pre-emptive attack against a threat that is 
more remote.”). 
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a doctrine.141 Consequently, the Iraq War, though fought on a 
preemptive theory with a broad international coalition, cannot 
reliably establish state practice or opinio juris for preemptive force. 
So far, nothing else can, either. 
Alternatively, given the uphill battle of arguing that there is a 
new international custom for preemptive self-defense, the United 
States may instead simply argue that nuclear weapons are 
inherently imminent threats, and therefore any action taken against 
them are anticipatory, not preemptive, acts of force. 
As explained in Part I, nuclear weapons arguably create an 
imminent and existential threat to the United States. At any 
moment, a nuclear ICBM is less than an hour away from destroying 
a landmass the size of Texas, and there is almost nothing that could 
stop it once launched.142 By this description, it is difficult to imagine 
a scenario that is more appropriately described as “instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation.”143 Thus, the United States could argue that violating 
sovereignty to prevent nuclear attacks has always been consistent 
with the Caroline standard, and that such actions have not yet taken 
place simply because they were historically impossible. Now that 
technology has allowed for boost-phase attacks on nuclear ICBMs, 
self-defense permits the United States to employ UAV DMDP to 
prevent an imminent and cataclysmic attack. 
But are ICBMs really imminent threats? Does a threat warrant 
preemptive self-defense if it is always imminent but rarely likely? 
Despite the theoretical appeal of the argument that nuclear 
weapons present imminent threats, the reality is the world has been 
faced with this exact scenario for over sixty years and no attack has 
ever taken place. Speculatively speaking, it seems unlikely that the 
international community would share the view that a threat which 
has been (more or less) effectively managed for the better part of a 
century is “instant and overwhelming.” Instead, given that 
countries and scholars alike view even the infringement upon 
territorial integrity as likely constituting an “armed attack” for the 
 
 141. Ashley S. Deeks, Taming the Doctrine of Pre-Emption, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 661, 676 (Marc Weller ed., 2015). 
 142. Supra notes 12–24 and accompanying text; Mosher, supra note 15; Gillespie,  
supra note 17. 
 143. Webster, supra note 93, at 58. 
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purposes of the UN Charter,144 sending in the weaponized UAV 
DMDP to hold constant positions above military targets will almost 
certainly be viewed as a preemptive self-defense move in response 
to a non-imminent threat. Just as the world condemned Israel’s 
attack on Iraq in 1981 because the attack occurred twelve to 
eighteen months before a threat could materialize,145 or how 
numerous countries condemned the invasion of Iraq in 2003 for 
prematurely responding to a potential nuclear threat,146 the United 
States would likely be condemned for violating the sovereignty of 
other states with the UAV DMDP without an active nuclear threat 
by those states.147  
For the foregoing reasons, the United States has no persuasive 
argument that international custom approves of preemptive attacks 
or that UAV DMDP responds to an imminent threat. 
CONCLUSION 
Because UAV DMDP cannot be justified under any accepted 
definition of imminence, it constitutes preemptive self-defense. 
And because preemptive self-defense violates international 
sovereignty law, UAV DMDP necessarily trades notions of 
traditional sovereignty for notions of contingent sovereignty. 
Therefore, adoption of UAV DMDP moves the world closer to a 
paradigm of contingent sovereignty. 
By unilaterally deciding into which countries and under what 
circumstances it will send armed aircraft, the United States rejects 
the idea that every state has the same sovereign right to control its 
airspace. Instead, it purports that American interests supersede the 
sovereignty rights of countries that do not live up to America’s 
 
 144. RUYS, supra note 54, at 185–86; Randelzhofer, supra note 54, at 123. 
 145. Rothwell, supra note 99, at 343–44. 
 146. Supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text. 
 147. I certainly do not mean to trivialize the reality of nuclear threats; rather, I only 
acknowledge that in light of the historical pattern of condemnation of states who have 
responded too quickly to actual, demonstrable nuclear threats, it is unlikely that the United 
States would successfully justify self-defense actions against hypothetical nuclear threats. 
This acknowledgment still leaves open the possibility that sufficiently high tensions with 
reliable intelligence indicating a nuclear strike could justify self-defense to an “armed attack” 
before an actual threat was issued. However, this would be a novel scenario and is, at this 
point, largely conjecture. The likelier scenario by far is that action taken in “self-defense” 
based only on concerns of the possibility of a nuclear strike would be seen as premature and 
constitute an illegal preemptive strike. 
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expectations. Whether such an approach is right or wrong is up for 
debate, but the world will look considerably different if this 
program moves it closer to a theory of contingent sovereignty. 
  In a contingent sovereignty world, sovereign equality and 
territorial integrity would no longer be fundamental components 
of the international order.148 Instead, the states of the world would 
be “haunted by the continuities of a differentiated and ambiguous 
sovereign status that is indexed to their imperial past.”149 This 
system would result in “the sustained violation of territorial 
integrity performed by hovering drones, where the terrain 
underneath is subjected to an on-going de facto form of 
occupation.”150 In this way, contingent sovereignty is dichotomous. 
On the one hand, there are strong states who maintain true 
sovereignty because they have the power to control their borders. 
On the other hand, there are weak states who have only contingent 
sovereignty because they can only control their territory when it 
suits the strong states.151 Such a system would be antithetical to the 
notion of sovereign equality among states and would greatly 
undermine the strength and purpose of the UN Charter. 
In fact, scholars need not even speculate on the consequences of 
moving from sovereign equality to contingent sovereignty—the 
consequences have been spelled out already in one of western 
civilization’s oldest histories. In Thucydides’ History of the 
Peloponnesian War, the Melian dialogue depicts perfectly how 
diplomacy works in a contingent sovereignty world.152 According 
to Thucydides’ account, the Melian people sought to stay neutral in 
the Peloponnesian war and are visited by an Athenian envoy sent 
to discuss their intentions.153 Upon arrival, the Athenians informed 
the Melians of their disinterest in arguments invoking justice or 
morality, asserting that what makes something “right” is “only in 
 
 148. See Sara Kendall, Cartographies of the Present: ‘Contingent Sovereignty’ and Territorial 
Integrity, NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 84, 88 (2016). 
 149. Campbell A.O. Munro, Mapping the Vertical Battlespace: Toward a Legal Cartography 
of Aerial Sovereignty, 2 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 233, 260 (2014). 
 150. Kendall, supra note 148, at 89. 
 151. Id. at 90–91. 
 152. See THUCYDIDES, THE MELIAN DIALOGUE: HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN  
WAR (431 BC). 
 153. Id. 
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question between equals in power, while the strong do what they 
can and the weak suffer what they must.”154 
Since the siege of Melos depicted by Thucydides centuries ago, 
history has repeatedly reaffirmed the Melian Dialogue’s starkest 
lesson on power dynamics. Only since the founding of the United 
Nations have powerful states been effectively constrained in the 
pursuit of their self-interest by principles other than “might makes 
right.”155 Abandoning now the principles of mutual security and 
sovereign equality would revert the world back to its days when 
self-determination belonged to the strong, while the “weak 
suffer[ed] what they must.”156 
In response to these projections, critics may argue that because 
the United States clearly designed UAV DMDP for nuclear ICBM 
defense and weak states do not have nuclear ICBMs, programs like 
UAV DMDP do not create a contingent sovereignty world because 
they will target only strong states, not weak states. However, even 
if programs like UAV DMDP were only used against strong states 
and its use against strong states was tempered by rival state power, 
it would still be a program undeniably designed to accomplish 
preemptive self-defense, and preemptive self-defense is 
irreconcilable with the current law of international sovereignty. 
Neither new treaties nor strategic targeting can rescue UAV DMDP 
from its preemptive purpose and sovereignty-eroding effects. 
Despite these and other concerns that UAV DMDP may raise, 
the United States will still most likely implement it as planned. 
First, reports already project it will be “hitting the skies in [2021] 
and its laser weapon blasting [by 2022].”157 Second, the United 
States has already dedicated tens of millions of dollars to the 
program, awarding contracts to General Atomics Electromagnetic 
Systems, Lockheed Martin Space Systems, and Boeing Defense 
Space & Security to help develop the technology necessary for UAV 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 68/262 (Apr. 1, 2014). Even now, the UN does not always 
succeed at deterring powerful states from ignoring the sovereignty of weaker states, such as 
Russia’s recent annexation of Crimea. See Fred Dews, NATO Secretary-General: Russia’s 
Annexation of Crimea is Illegal and Illegitimate, BROOKINGS (Mar. 19, 2014), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2014/03/19/nato-secretary-general-
russias-annexation-of-crimea-is-illegal-and-illegitimate/. 
 156. THUCYDIDES, supra note 152. 
 157. Barrie, supra note 5. 
4.FORSGREN_FIN.NH (DO NOT DELETE)  3/27/2021  1:49 AM 
881 Death Star Drones 
 881 
 
DMDP.158 Investments such as these convey a serious intent by the 
United States to develop and use the technology. Third, drone 
technology does not exclusively belong to the United States; in fact, 
nearly one hundred other countries currently have military 
drones.159 If the United States decides not to pioneer the way 
forward with UAV DMDP, there is a good chance that it will be 
subjected to the will of another country that does. 
Furthermore, judging from the United States’ past actions in 
comparable situations like Libya in 1986, the National Security 
Strategy in 2002, the Iraq invasion in 2003, and the Unwilling or 
Unable Doctrine in 2014, it seems that U.S. security interests rarely 
lose to sovereignty status quo interests, even in the face of 
widespread criticism. Most recently, the United States reaffirmed 
its preference for security interests over sovereignty concerns by 
assassinating Iran’s Major General Qassem Soleimani in January of 
2020.160 The United States killed General Soleimani via drone strike 
while the General was leaving the Baghdad airport in Iraq.161 By 
way of justification, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that 
Soleimani was an “imminent threat to American lives,” implying 
the strike was covered by self-defense.162 
By so claiming, the United States seems to argue that “imminent 
threats” include the very existence of military persons who have 
 
 158. Andrew Wheeler, Inside the U.S. Missile Agency’s Quest for a UAV Laser Weapon to 
Take Out ICBMs, ENGINEERING.COM (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.engineering.com/ 
Hardware/ArticleID/17618/Inside-the-US-Missile-Agencys-Quest-for-a-UAV-Laser-
Weapon-to-Take-Out-ICBMs.aspx; see also Lockheed Martin’s Missile Defense Laser Concept 
Continues Toward Development, LOCKHEED MARTIN (Oct. 30, 2018), 
https://news.lockheedmartin.com/news-releases?item=128605; Arun Mathew, Boeing 
Awarded Contract for Low Power Laser Demonstrator (LPLD) Phase 1 Effort, DEFPOST.COM  
(Dec. 10, 2017), https://defpost.com/boeing-awarded-contract-low-power-laser-
demonstrator-lpld-phase-1-effort/; James LaPorta, General Atomics Awarded $8.8M Contract 
for Low Power Laser Demonstrator,  UNITED PRESS INT’L (Nov. 7, 2017, 1:58 PM), 
https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2017/11/07/General-Atomics-awarded-88M-
contract-for-low-power-laser-demonstrator/8501510080357/. 
 159. Ryan Pickrell, Nearly 100 Countries Have Military Drones, and It’s Changing the Way 
the World Prepares for War, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 27, 2019, 3:13 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/world-rethinks-war-as-nearly-100-countries-field-
military-drones-2019-9?. 
 160. Lyse Doucet, Qasem Soleimani: US Kills Top Iranian General in Baghdad Air Strike, 
BBC NEWS (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50979463. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Sean Illing, An Expert on Why the Soleimani Assassination Was Almost Certainly 
Illegal, VOX (Jan. 3, 2020, 1:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/1/3/21048012/iran-
general-killed-qasem-soleimani-legality. 
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harmed the United States in the past and will likely do so again.163 
In Soleimani’s case, the United States believed he constituted such 
an “imminent threat” that self-defense principles could justify 
operating military aircraft in Iraqi sovereign airspace and 
launching lethal attacks without authorization.164 The attack on 
Soleimani, along with the aforementioned examples, serves as 
weighty evidence that modern day self-defense calculations look 
less and less like the Caroline test and more like a single-question 
test of contingent sovereignty: are a powerful state’s objectives 
more important than a weaker state’s sovereign rights? 
The problem of the UAV DMDP is a classic problem of liberty 
versus security. If the United States does not implement UAV 
DMDP, it denies itself the “holy grail” of missile defense systems; 
if it does, it takes a large step toward making international 
sovereignty conditional upon American discretion. The former 
option leaves the United States vulnerable to a nuclear catastrophe; 
the latter undermines one of the foundational doctrines of the 
modern international regime. In all likelihood, the United States 
will implement UAV DMDP and lead the world on a steady march 
toward contingent sovereignty. 
 
 
 163. An instance such as this potentially could be justified by a theory of interceptive 
self-defense, but decidedly not by traditional self-defense analysis according to the Caroline 
test. For a discussion on interceptive self-defense, see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION 
AND SELF-DEFENCE (6th ed. 2017). 
 164. Doucet, supra note 160. 
